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CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION IN CALIFORNIA WATER LAW-
Leo A. Huard*
Administrative law is a much abused term which has many meanings for
many people. In some contexts, administrative law is equated with the term
"administration" which is, in turn, related to the verb "to administer." In
that sense, an administrative agency becomes an executive agency and ad-
ministrative law is the law which concerns the executive branch of govern-
ment. In the legislative history of the Reorganization Act of 1956, the
Department of Water Resources is occasionally described as an administra-
tive agency, where the documents obviously have reference to the executive
branch of government. This identity of meaning between "executive" and
"administrative" is unnecessarily restrictive, and, if widely used, would make
nameless a large segment of administrative law. We avoid such use of the
terms "executive" and "administrative."
In this text, the term administrative law refers to the rules, regulations
and decision of the administrators, boards and commissions to whom the law
has given rule-making and adjudicatory powers. Generally these agencies
fall outside the time-honored branches of government: i.e., executive, legis-
lative and judicial, but have some of the powers of each of the classic branches.
For that reason, they are ordinarily described as independent, quasi-legisla-
tive and quasi-judicial agencies. In California, the State Water Rights Board
is such an agency. Occasionally, a part of the executive branch is also given
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers and duties. In that case, its output
of rules, regulations and decisions forms a part of administrative law. The
Department of Water Resources is an executive department which has been
assigned some quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial duties by law. This does
not change the fact that the department is still an executive agency-a part
of the executive branch of government. The agencies studied herein are de-
scribed by their principal characteristics, using the terms executive, legislative,.judicial and administrative within the context of the preceding paragraphs.
This article is divided into two parts. The first part outlines the principal
powers and duties of each of the agencies under study: The Department of
Water Resources, the State Water Rights Board and the California Water
Commission.
The second part is devoted to identifying the areas where the jurisdiction
of each agency overlaps the jurisdiction of one or both of the other agencies.
These instances of interfering or concurring powers and duties are isolated and
discussed.
I. POWERS AND DUTIES
a. Department of Water Resources
The functions of the department are many and varied. They fall, however,
into certain well-defined categories. The department has promotional duties.'
* The substance of this paper was first issued as a Report prepared for the Fact-Finding
Committee on Water of the Senate of the State of California. Minor editorial changes
have been made for the present publication. The purpose of the Report was to examine
the statutory jurisdiction of the State Department of Water Resources, the California
Water Commission and the State Water Rights Board. The views expressed are those
of the author and should not be attributed to the Senate Fact-Finding Committee on
Water. its chairman, members or staff.
**Professor of Law and Dean of the School of Law, University of Santa Clara.
I. Cal. Ann. Water Code § 205 (West 1954). Further references to West's Annotated
California Codes of 1954 will be to code name and section number only.
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It carries out several varieties of investigations. 2 and supervises3' a number of
operations. In many respects the department is an enforcement agency, 4 and,
since it plans and executes, it is also an operational agency. 5
Promotion, investigation, supervision, enforcement and operations are
typical of the executive branch of government. The department makes few
rules and holds few hearings. It is not primarily a regulatory agency nor is it
primarily a judicial agency. The rules and regulations 6 which fall within the
scope of departmental activities are incidental to its executive duties as are its
hearing7 functions. The department could not be described as a quasi-legis-
lative and quasi-judicial agency in the nature, for instance, of the Federal
Trade Commission. By contrast, it could be described as resembling the In-
terior Department-an agency whose quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
functions are secondary to its executive functions.
The legislature has delegated certain policy-making powers to the de-
partment. These are rather carefully circumscribed and are shared with the
California Water Commission.8 They are discussed infra. For the present.
it should be noted that policy-making is not per se inconsistent with the char-
acter of the department as an executive agency. At both the federal and state
levels, executive departments frequently make important policy under the guid-
ance of the chief executive, president or governor.
b. California Water Commission
In the 1956 reorganization, the Department of Water Resources was es-
tablished as a strong executive department to interpret and carry out the
water policies of the legislature under the direction and control of the gov-
ernor. o At the same time, the commission was created as a citizens' advisory
group to operate as a watchdog on the activities of the department in the public
interest. In order to better protect the public interest, the law provided that
all parts of the state be represented on the commission so far as practicable."0
It seems to have been conceived as a conduit through which the legislative
intent would be piped directly to the department."'
The commission consists of nine members appointed by the governor and
confirmed by the senate. The commission is charged by law with the duty of
advising the director of the department with respect to all matters under his
jurisdiction.'z All rules and regulations of the department, other than purely
internal rules, "shall be first presented by the director to the commission and
shall become effective only upon approval thereof by the commission." 13 The
plain and. ordinary meaning of this language is that the director's rule-making
power is ineffective without the commission's approval. No rule promulgated
by the department subsequent to the enactment of this section should have
any legal effect unless the procedure set out in the section was followed. Stand-
2. E.g. Water Code § 225, 227-232, 32670-32672.
3. E.g. Water Code § 226, 275, 400-415, 6000-6452.
4. E.g. Water Code II 400-415, 8300 et seq., 20822-20823.
5. E.g. Water Code § 7076, 400-4407, 8300 et seq., 22335-22338.
6. E.g. Water Code . 4150.
7. E.g. Water Code § 414.
8. Water Code §§ 120-139, 150-163.
9. A Department of Water Resources for California, Report of the Assembly Interim
Committee on Government Organization. California Legislature (Peb. 8, 1956). pp.
73-90.
10. Water Code § 152.
11. Report supra, note 9 at pp. 84-86.
12. Water Code §§ 150, 151, 155, 161.
13. Water Code § 161. Author's italics.
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ing alone, this section seems to make the department powerless to issue any
rules of which the commission disapproves.
The statute uses the word "shall" rather than "must." Ordinarily, it could
be argued that "shall" might be directory and that the statute only points out
a desirable way of making rules rather than the only way. However, section
15 of the Water Code sets this matter at rest: " 'shall' is mandatory and 'may'
is permissive." Approval of rules by the commission is then a prerequisite to
validity.
Section 162 expressed the intention of the legislature that "in the making
of all major departmental determinations, policies and procedures, such as de-
partmental recommendations to the legislature, the director and the California
Water Commission shall be in agreement whenever possible; but for the pur-
pose of fixing responsibility to the governor and to the legislature, in the event
of disagreement between the director and the commission upon such matters,
the views of the director shall prevail."14 The commission and the director
are then to make written reports of the disagreement to the governor, the presi-
dent pro tern of the senate and the speaker of the assembly. Again the lines
of authority cross, but in this instance, the commission finds itself in the com-
pletely ineffectual position of giving advice which the director is virtually
urged to Ignore.
In eminent domain proceedings, the director must first issue a declaration
that public interest requires that the particular proceeding be undertaken, and
such declaration "supported by a resolution of the California Water Commis-
sion . * . shall be conclusive evidence" of necessity for public improve-
ment and other matters. 15 It should be noted, however, that in California
it is unconstitutional to exercise the power of eminent domain for other
than public use. Determination of a public use is, therefore, reserved to the
courts. The nature of a use as public or private is ultimately a judicial question.
Determination by the department and the commission of public use would carry
no conclusiveness in court.' 6
Jurisdiction over state applications for water (state filings) has become
clouded. Originally, the basic objective of water rights administration was
to provide an orderly procedure for applying the principle of the law of
appropriatiorl that first in time is first in right. The procedure adopted re-
quired applicants to proceed with due diligence toward perfecting an ap-
propriation by prescribing specific times within which a project must be
completed and the water applied to beneficial use. Applicants and permittees
who failed to act with the prescribed "due diligence" soon found that their
applications or permits had been cancelled. This is still the practice.
During the early 1920's, it became apparent that California would also
have to exercise control over use of its waters in order to insure a coordi-
nated development of its water resources and make certain that fast-growing
areas did not deprive slow-growing areas of water in the future. The
mechanism of water rights was used to achieve the required control. In this
scheme, the legislature created a special type of water right usually referred
to as "state filings." and specifically exempted such filinqs from the require-
ments of "due diligence" until they were assigned. This contradicted a
14. Water Code § 162.
15. Water Code § 251. A similar resolution applies specifically to eminent domain pro-
ceedinqs within the Central Valley Project.
16. 17 Cal. Jur. 2d 721: Sherman v. Buick, 32 Cal. 241; Nickey v. Stearns Ranchos Co.,
126 Cal. 150; Hercules Water Co. v. Fernandez, 5 Cal. App. 726; Rindge Co. v. Los
Angeles County. 262, U.S. 700.
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normal condition of appropriative water rights and set the stage for some
of our present difficulties.
There was little activity in state filings until the latter part of the 1940's
and administrative confusion was kept to a minimum during this period
until 1956. This was principally due to two factors then in existence. First,
the Department of Finance was responsible for the administration of state
filings until 1956, but it had no staff to handle the matter and little familiarity
with the subject. Consequently, that department usually acted upon the
recommendations of the State Engineer, who was also responsible for water
rights administration. Second, until the late 1940's state filings were con-
centrated on the principal streams within the Central Valley Basin and were
generally filed in contemplation of the Central Valley Project. Within the
last ten years, new state filings have been made covering nearly all the re-
maining unappropriated water in California. In addition, counties of origin
have begun to recognize the importance of these filings to their future growth.
The first factor outlined above, i.e., reliance by the Department of Finance
on the technical expertise of the State Engineer, is of prime importance to
the study of jurisdiction over water rights. Under that system, for all prac-
tical purposes, the State Engineer: (a) administered water rights; (b) con-
trolled the procedures on state filings: and (c) determined and resolved
conflicts with the general or coordinated plan of development of state water
resources. Today these functions are carried on by the State Water Rights
Board, the California Water Commission and the Department of Water
Resources.
Since 1959, the commission may release from priority or assign any por-
tion of any application filed as a state filing when such release or assignment
is not in conflict with the state's general water plan.17 Release and assign-
ment can only be ,made after a public hearing upon sixty days' notice to all
interested parties.1s Recipients of releases from priority or assignments are
required to submit project changes and amendments to the commission for
prior approval.19 There is in this provision an overlap of jurisdiction
with the State Water Rights Board.2o . Commission actions are subject to
judicial review by a species of statutory mandamus. It should be noted that
these hearings are not legislative hearings for the purpose of investigation
or inquiry. They are judicial hearings to adjudicate rights between oppos-
ing parties. It should be noted also that Section 162 is made inapplicable to
matters subject to Sections 10504-10507.21
Section 12602 empowers the director or his representative to appear
before Congress and the executive departments of the Federal Government
regarding any water matters of concern to California.2 2 This section is
sometimes considered to give the commission the enumerated representative
powers as agent of the department. It should be noted, however, that section
12602 spells out a power formerly belonging to the State Water Resources
Board. Section 150 continues the board in existence as the California
Water Commission but only with the "powers and duties provided in this
article."23 The powers of section 12602 are specifically reposed in the de-
17. Water Code § 10504.
18. Water Code § 10504.1.
19. Water Code § 10504.5(a).
20. Water Code § 10504.4(b).
21. Water Code 10504.2. Section 162 holds that in the event of a disagreement between
the director and the commission, the director shall prevail.
22. Water Code § 12602.
23. Id. at § 150.
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partment and are not "provided" for the commission "in this article." There
is, therefore, some doubt that the commission can represent the department
by virtue of section 12602. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that
the director of the department can appoint the commission as the depart-
ment's representative under his general executive powers.
Section 12883 requires prior approval by the commission before the di-
rector of the department can make a loan under the Davis-Grunsky Act.2 4
Section 12885 requires prior commission approval before the director can
make a grant for fish, wildlife and recreational purposes under the Davis-
Grunsky Act.25 In both cases, the authority of the director clashes with the
power of the commission.
At first glance, the commission seems to be primarily a legislative agent.
Its watchdog function is a hallmark of legislative committees and its repre-
sentative membership parallels that of a legislative organization. Thelanguage of the statute imposes upon the commission the duty of checking
on the department's activities, thereby making it unlikely that the commis-
sion is also a part of the executive branch. However, it seems clear that
the chairman of the Senate Fact Finding Committee and the committee staff
regard the commission as part and parcel of the executive branch. The
department and the commission itself seem to share this view. If the com-
mission was in fact intended to be a legislative agent this intent certainly
has never been realized.
The commission also has policy-making and adjudicatory functions. This
mixture of functions gives the commission a somewhat schizoid character.
c. State Water Rights Board
The California legislature has delegated three areas of activity to theState Water Rights Board. The board administers the water appropriation
statutes of the state, 26 assists the courts and the parties in the adjudication
of water rights27 and administers state statutes providing for the recor-dation of extraction of ground water and diversion of surface water. 28
The first of these functions is largely quasi-judicial, i.e., the board engagesin holding adjudicatory hearings between adversary parties.2 9 In reaching
its decisions, however, the board must estimate future conditions in order
to prescribe rules for the future as required by the public interest. To the
extent that future rules are involved, the hearing function is quasi-legisla-
tive30 as well as quasi-judicial.
The second function is to a limited extent quasi-judicial. The thirdfunction operates only upon four Southern California counties and the action
of the board thereunder is ministerial.31
Policy-making by the board is an incidental effect of the rules it pro-
mulgates and the cases it decides. The board is an independent tribunal
rather than an arm of the legislature or of the executive.
24. Id. at § 12883.
25. Id. at § 12885.
26. Holsinger. Procedures and Practice before the California State Water Rights Board, 45Cal. L. Rev. 676 (1957), Water Code ss. 1200-1801.
27. Ibid. Water Code §§ 2000-2900.
28. Ibid. Water Code § 4999-5008;see also, Water Code § 179.
29. Holsinger, supra, note 25 at 677-678.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
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11. OVERLAPPING AND CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
a. The Department and the Commission
Tle major overlap of jurisdiction between these two agencies is caused
by sections 161 and 162 of the Water Code. The contents of these sections
have been discussed in considerable detail earlier in this report. They will
he reviewed only briefly here.
Section 161 first ordains that the commission shall confer With and advise
the director on all matters under his jurisdiction. The section goes on to
split rule-making authority by requiring that all departmental rules and regu-
lations shall be subject to commission approval.
It should be noted that this approval requirement of section 161 thrusts
the commission directly into the administration of the department. The pro-
ponents of the 1956 reorganization purported to deplore any arrangement
having this effect. . 2 Yet section 161 establishes the commission as a super-
director of the department in rule-making matters.
Section 162 expresses the "intention" of the legislature that the director
and the commission be in agreement whenever possible in formulating all
major departmental determinations, policies and procedures. This is not an
enactment of law. At best, it expresses a pious and hopeful sentiment. It fails
to take into account that the policy-making interests of the directors and of
the commission may be at odds in the normal course of honest and effective
government. It may be healthy for the public interest to have this moderate
amount of disagreement.
The next clause of section 162 elaborates on this relationship between
director and commission by providing that in the event of disagreement be-
tween' the director and the department, the views of the director shall pre-
vail. As indicated earlier, this is an open invitation for a strong director
to ignore the commission. For a weak director, it may well provide an excuse
to give up strong points and compromise established positions. In either case,
the statutory proviso is the antithesis of good government.
. Sections 12883 and 12885, dealing with Davis-Grunsky loans and grants,
are instances of workable concurrent jurisdiction. The department makes
the- loans - an executive function. The commission approves each loan-
an ad hoc policy determination. The department and the commission both
have a certain measure of authority. However, commission approval of the
department's action is required in clear, unequivocal language. There is no
doubt that ultimate authority lies with the commission.
, .The conflicts arising out of overlapping and concurrent jurisdiction be-
tween the department and the commission are largely due to the following
causes:
a. Failure to recognize that the department is primarily an operational
executive agency whereas the commission is conceptually at least, a
policy-making legislative agency.
b. Failure to recognize that the executive initially3a interprets the law
and then carries it into being whereas the policy-maker expresses and
explains the law and points out how it should be carried out.
c. Allowing the commission to intrude into the administration of the
department's purely executive business.
32. A Department of Water Resources for California, supra, note 9 at pp. 84-86.
33. The courts finally interpret the law but the executive must give it a prima facie inter-
pretation in order to put it into effect.
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b. The Department and the State Water Rights Board
There appear to be no areas of overlapping jurisdiction between the
board and the department. The jurisdiction of the board has been clearly
spelled out.3 * The function of the department with respect to board activi-
ties is equally clear:
"The department ...shall have an interest and may appear as a
party in any hearing held by the board and may commence or appear,
in any judicial proceeding brought to inquire into the validity of any
action, order, or decision of the board. ' '35
Section 187 provides for an exchange of information between the depart,
ment and the board to avoid unnecessary duplication. The possibility of con-flict inherent in this requirement is eliminated by the proviso that no exchangebe made when "in the opinion of the agency possessing the ...informationi,i
such exchange would be detrimental to the public interest."36
The board is an independent regulatory agency, and the present statutoryframework between it and the department adequately protects the board'sindependence. Such independence is vital to an agency adjudicating contro-
versies between adversary parties. It is not clear that the board is equallyprotected from legislative interference. There are no apparent signs of undue
legislative influence, however.
There is some urging that the Watermaster Service (Water Code §§4000-4407) be placed within the control of the State Water Rights Board.This seems undesirable since the board has no other operational functions.Supervision of the Watermaster Service is foreign to the normal quasi-judi-
cial functions of this agency.
c. The Commission and the State Water Rights Board
The commission is primarily a watchdog and policy-making agency. In
both capacities it is conceptually an agent of the legislature although, inpractice, it is widely regarded to be an executive agent.
In addition to this, it has adjudicatory functions under sections 10504-10507. These adjudications deal with state applications for water and in-
volve judicial-type hearings between parties who are technically adversaries.
In such hearings, the tribunal must be an independent one free of undue in-fluence. Recognizing this, the law frees the commission from any possibledomination by the department.S7 There is, however, no proviso specificallyfreeing the commission from legislative influence in these hearings. We haveheretofore raised this point with respect to the State Water Rights Board.We raise it again because of the current scandal involving ex parte contactsin quasi-judicial hearings before federal administrative agencies. Some of
these ex parte contacts have been shown to come from members of Con-gress. As in the case of the board, there are no apparent signs of undue legis-
lative influence over the commission.
Of more immediate concern is the fact that section 10504.5(b) providesfor duplicate hearings-first before the commission and then again before
the State Water Rights Board. This procedure seems unwise and it is cer-
tainly inefficient. However, this duplicate system of adjudication has been
34. Water Code 179.
35. Water Code 184.
36. Water Code 187.37. Water Code § 10504.2 specifically providing that § 162 (agreement between depart-
ment and commission) is inapplicable to § 10504-10507 matters.
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determined to be necessary because of the historical development of the law
relating to state filings. History discloses, so the reasoning runs, that state
filings are different from all other applications to appropriate water. State
filings are per se a matter of public interest affecting the overall water plans
of the State of California. For that reason, they should be assigned or re-
leased only with the greatest care and deliberation. They should not be dis-
posed of by an agency whose normal function it is to deal with private rights.
Without assessing the merits of this argument, it should be noted that
this reasoning has little validity, taken in the whole context of administrative
law. There is no reason, in administrative law, why an independent regula-
tory agency dealing with private rights cannot, at the same time, also deal
with public rights without loss of honesty, integrity and regard for the public
interest. Nothing in such law disqualifies the State Water Rights Board from
disposing of state filings.
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